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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines both the processes and outcomes of governance in the context of the 
EU’s relationship with ACP States within the period of the Cotonou Agreement (CA). It 
discusses and assesses a variety of governance mechanisms, including the European 
Commission’s use of the governance concept, EPAs, manifestations of partner preferences, 
the EDF, the revision of the CA, and Fisheries Partnership Agreements. Specific examples of 
the wielding of each mechanism are assessed based upon two criteria: a) the extent to 
which the wielding of the mechanism by the EU is a manifestation of “good governance”, 
and b) the extent to which the EU’s wielding of the mechanism has resulted, or is likely to 
result, in the sustainable development of and reduction of poverty in ACP countries. The 
examples are chosen to illustrate contradictions between rhetoric and practice and the 
consequential negative (actual and potential) impact upon development in ACP States. The 
final section offers suggestions for improving the EU’s governance processes and their 
outcomes for development. 
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1 IS THE EU’S GOVERNANCE ‘GOOD’?: AN ASSESSMENT OF EU GOVERNANCE IN 
ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH ACP STATES 
1.1 Background 
This paper argues that there is a discrepancy between the rhetoric of good governance 
employed by the European Union (EU)1 and the consequences of its own governance 
practices. The argument is based on an examination of the forms of governance that are 
being promoted and exhibited by the European Union in its relationship with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States within the framework of the Cotonou 
Agreement (CA) (2000 – 2020). The evaluation proceeds in two steps: first, the paper 
assesses the extent to which the concept of ‘good governance’, as promoted by the EU, is 
applied by the EU within the context of its relationship with ACP States. Second, the paper 
evaluates the extent to which governance strategies displayed by the EU promote 
sustainable development and the alleviation of extreme poverty in ACP States.  It is posited 
that, like most other donor agencies, the EU does not clearly articulate the objectives of its 
governance agenda, and acts in such a way that its processes of governance and their 
outcomes fail to fulfill the criteria for good governance that it sets for others.  
The paper first introduces the ACP Group, and the EU bodies that are relevant to its 
relationship with ACP States. We then briefly discuss key concepts that structure the ACP – 
EU relationship including governance, partnership and power, and development. Next, 
various governance instruments employed by the EU in its relationship with the ACP States 
are identified. Examples of each instrument are discussed and assessed based upon two 
criteria: a) the extent to which the wielding of the mechanism by the EU is a manifestation 
of “good governance”, and b) the extent to which the EU’s wielding of the mechanism has 
resulted, or is likely to result, in the sustainable development of and reduction of poverty 
in ACP countries. The final section summarizes the assessment and offers recommendation 
for improving consistency between the EU’s governance in its relations with ACP States and 
the governance it alleges to promote through its development cooperation with them.  
1.2 ACP Group 
The ACP Group of States is constituted by 79 developing countries, all but one (Cuba) of 
which have signed the CA, which officiates the relationship between the ACP Group and the 
EU. The Group’s founding statute is the Georgetown Agreement2, and it has a permanent 
Secretariat, which is based in Brussels, Belgium. The Summit of ACP Heads of State and 
Government is the supreme organ of the Group, whilst the ACP Council of Ministers is the 
Group’s main decision-making body. The Council is assisted by a Brussels-based ACP 
Committee of Ambassadors in the execution of its tasks. The Group is structured into six 
regions: the Caribbean, the Pacific, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern 
Africa.3  
                                                
1 Unless otherwise stated, the acronym EU will be used throughout the remainder of the paper, also 
when referring to the earlier European Economic Community (EEC) and the present European 
Community (EC). 
 
2 Signed on 6 June 1975. 
3 Bradley 2004. 
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1.3 Relevant EU Bodies 
The EU currently consists of 27 Member States. Common governing bodies of the EU include 
the European Council and the European Commission. The European Commission comprises a 
number of services that have a direct influence on ACP-EC relations, including ‘DG 
Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States’, responsible for 
development policy; ‘DG External Cooperation Programmes’ (EuropeAid), responsible for 
the implementation of development programmes and projects; ‘DG Relex’, responsible for 
external relations; ‘DG Trade’; and ‘ECHO’, responsible for humanitarian aid. These 
services operate in a semi-autonomous fashion and have different interpretations of the 
objectives enshrined in the EU Development Consensus4. In addition, most of the 27 EU 
Member States possess national development policies and instruments. 
                                                
4 ECDPM and ActionAid, unpublished discussion note. 
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2 GOVERNANCE  
The word ‘governance’ derives from a Greek word that means ‘to steer’.  Academics from 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds have elaborated upon the ‘steering’ concept. Kooiman5 
concurs with the work of Rosenau6 in defining governance as ‘all those activities of social, 
political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, 
control or manage societies’. Rosenau elaborates that governance encompasses the 
activities of government as well as ‘many other channels through which commands flow’, 
and includes framing goals, issuing directives, pursuing policies and changing norms.7 
Smouts8 emphasizes governance as a process that necessitates continual interaction and 
Finkelstein9 highlights the role of ‘purposive actors’ in this process. Similarly, the definition 
of governance proposed by Mayntz as ‘forms of collective regulation of social 
circumstances’10 and that of Lange and Schimank as ‘patterns of regulating 
interdependence’ accent the mutual influence of all concerned actors in a holistic manner 
on each other in the direction of their affairs.11  
Within a policy context, in a Communication in 2003, the EC describes governance as ‘the 
rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, 
and power is exercised in society’.12 It further specifies that ‘the way public functions are 
carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised is 
the major issue to be addressed in that context’, and that ‘governance concerns the state’s 
ability to serve the citizens’.  
The above definitions offered by academics and policymakers all focus on governance as a 
process, leaving the goals and outcomes of these processes unspecified. In contrast, a 
definition of governance emanating from the World Bank directly incorporates development 
as a goal of governance and thereby stipulates not only what governance is as a process, 
but also what the outcome of such a process should be. In defining governance as ‘the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development’, the World Bank explicitly makes a normative statement.13 
However, even when not made explicit, assertions about governance often carry a covert 
idea about what the ends of governance processes should be.  
 
 
 
                                                
5 Kooiman 1993, 2. 
6 Rosenau 1992. 
7 Rosenau 1995, 14. 
8 Smouts 1998. 
9 Finkelstein 1995. 
10 Mayntz 2004, 66. Authors translation from German. In original: ‘aller nebeneinander bestehenden 
Formen der kollektiven Regelung gesellschaftlicher Sachverhalte’.  
11 Lange and Schimank 2004, 19. Authors translation from German. In original: ‘Muster der 
Interdependenzbewältigung’. 
12 Commission Communication 2003, par. 3. 
13 World Bank 1992, 1. 
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2.1 Good Governance   
The ‘good’ in ‘good governance’ has been employed sometimes as an adverb, to evaluate 
the process of governance (which would more correctly be put as ‘well governed’); in other 
instances it is used as an adjective, to evaluate the outcomes of this process. For example, 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights identifies the key attributes of ‘good 
governance’ as: transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, and 
responsiveness (to the needs of the people).14 Thus, in this conception the normative 
evaluation ‘good’ addresses the processes of governance, not its outcomes. Orienting more 
toward the outcomes of governance, UN Resolution 2000/64 expressly links good 
governance to ‘prompting growth and sustainable human development’.15 Mr. Kofi Annan, 
Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in 1997 that, ‘Good governance and 
sustainable development are indivisible’.16 The CA defines good governance as:  
“…the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, 
economic and financial resources for the purpose of equitable and 
sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the 
level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the 
primacy of the rule of law in the management of resources and capacity 
building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular to 
preventing and combating corruption.17  
In this passage, the evaluation ‘good’ captures both the process of governance 
(‘management’) and the (intended) outcome of governance, which is specified as 
‘equitable and sustainable development’.18  
2.2 Poor or Malign Governance 
A lack of good governance might be called ‘poor’ or ‘bad’ governance. As with its 
counterpart, an unfavourable evaluation of governance can either describe the process or 
the outcomes of governance. Bad governance – or more adeptly: ‘poorly governed’ – can 
describe opaque (as opposed to transparent) management, a lack of clearly defined rules 
and procedures, or a failure to implement such rules and procedures (e.g. not being 
accountable to the defined rules and procedures). However, opacity and ad-hoc decision 
making may or may not result in deprivation or lack of choice (outcomes).19 On the other 
hand, ‘bad’ can evaluate the outcomes of governance and be understood as management of 
human, natural, economic and financial resources that contributes to or entrenches 
deprivation.20  
In light of Nafziger’s discussion of government actions that instill or perpetuate violence or 
hunger as a tool of oppression, we can contrast good governance not only with poor 
governance but with what we can call malign governance.21 The difference between malign 
and bad is the attribution of intentionality in malignancy, but the outcomes can look 
identical. Since intentions cannot be empirically proven, an evaluation cannot empirically 
                                                
14 UNHCHR 2008. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Annan 1997. 
17 European Union 2000, 9.3. 
18 Equality, or rather inequality, has lately received much attention from development economists. 
See, for example, Jolly 2007, Noorbakhsh 2007, Stewart 2008 and Uslaner 2007.  
19 See Sen 1999 for definition of development. 
20 Following Sen 1999, ’deprivation’ is used to connote the opposite of development and is elaborated 
below.  
21 Nafziger 2007. 
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distinguish the two. However, intentionality can be an important factor in determining how 
to promote good governance when it is lacking. For example, one would address poor 
governance outcomes that were unintended (e.g. the consequence of ignorance) differently 
from those that result from intentional corruption.  
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3 PARTNERSHIP AND POWER 
In studying governance, Yanakopoulos argues the importance of studying the actors, their 
relationships and the quality of these relationships, emphasizing the role of power 
asymmetries in relationships between actors.22 According to Webster’s unabridged 
encyclopaedic dictionary, a ‘partnership’ is ‘the state or condition of being a partner; 
participation; association; joint interest’. A ‘partner’ is defined as, ‘a person who shares or 
is associated with another is some action or endeavour; sharer; associate’. The partnership 
principle has been introduced in the context of contemporary development cooperation to 
suggest an evolution from the traditional vertical relation between the donor and recipient 
to a relationship characterized by cooperation between equals. Thus, in describing ‘good 
governance’, UN Resolution 2000/64 recognizes ‘the value of partnership approaches to 
development cooperation and the inappropriateness of prescriptive approaches’.23 
The first use of the partnership concept by the EU in its relations with third countries was 
in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, concluded in 1995.24 On 23 June 2000 in Cotonou, 
the EU signed a Partnership Agreement with the ACP Group of States.25 The resulting ACP – 
EU Partnership Agreement (CA) was heralded as the ‘most advanced and comprehensive 
development cooperation agreement between the North and the South’ by the then EU 
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Mr. Poul Nielson, who also specified 
that ‘partnership goes hand-in-hand with ownership and mutual confidence’.26 In addition, 
at the second EU-Africa Summit in 2007, an Africa-EU Strategic Partnership was endorsed to 
formalise a strategic partnership between the EU and Africa based on the principals of 
equality, partnership and ownership to guide future cooperation.27 
As suggested in the definition, a partnership is generally not an end in itself, but a means 
to achieve common objectives. The objectives of the ACP - EU partnership, as stipulated at 
the beginning of the CA are:  
“…to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development 
of the ACP States, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to 
promoting a stable and democratic political environment. The partnership 
shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating 
poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the 
gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.”28  
The nature of a ‘partnership’ is inherently defined in part by the balance of power between 
the ‘partners’. The power asymmetries between the ‘North’ and ‘South’ have been 
underscored by many writers.29 The power differential between donor and developing 
countries and its manifestation in control over access to resources has been noted by 
Birdsall who writes that ‘…the powerful make and implement the rules, as the limited 
                                                
22 Yanakopoulos 2005. 
23 UNHCR 2008. 
24 European Union 1995. 
25 European Union 2000. 
26 Courier 2000, 3. 
27 African Union 2007. 
28 European Union 2007, 1. 
29 See for example Yanakopoulos 2005. 
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access of developing countries to certain rich-country markets suggest[s].’30 Similarly, a 
BOND31 briefing paper argues that although ‘donors prefer to focus the governance lens 
more narrowly within the confines of recipient countries, this distorts understanding of the 
ways in which global power structures impact on national politics’.32 Global power 
structures have an important impact on ACP national and regional politics, and on 
development. Therefore an understanding of governance processes and outcomes can only 
be gained by considering these structures. We consider a part of these power structures: 
those inherent in the relationship between the ACP States and the EU.  
Power asymmetries infiltrate all aspects of the ACP-EU partnership, including provisions 
designed to govern the relationship. The use of one of the provisions for political dialogue 
between the ACP and the EU illuminates the actual – in contrast to the rhetorical – 
distribution of power. In its Communication on Governance and Development, the European 
Commission discusses the modalities in the CA that provide for ‘consultation procedures’ 
within the context of ‘policy dialogue’, which is seen as a key element of good 
governance.33 The Communication refers to Article 9 of the CA, which specifies that respect 
for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law constitute ‘essential elements’ 
of the partnership and that good governance is its ‘fundamental element’. Article 96 of the 
CA:  
“…foresees that in cases of violation of one of [the] essential elements one 
party can invite the other party to hold consultations…. Consultations under 
Article 96 aim at examining the situation with a view to finding a solution 
acceptable to both parties. If no solution is found, or in emergency cases, 
or if one party refuses the consultations, appropriate measures can be 
taken.”34 
Although this provision is phrased to allow either party to invoke it, only the EU has ever 
done so, reflecting the division of power within the relationship. All 14 cases to date in 
which consultations were undertaken in accordance with Article 96 were subsequent to 
alleged violations by ACP States. The manner in which these consultations have been 
conducted, and the imposition of commitments and undertakings on the country in question 
have led ACP Heads of State and Government to include in ACP Summit Declarations an 
appeal to the EU to avoid recourse to unilateral measures (ACP Secretariat, Declarations of 
the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Summits of ACP Heads of State and Government, held in 2002, 2004, 
2006 and 2008). Despite many apparent violations that could have been framed under 
Articles 96 and 97 of the CA, the ACP Group has never called the EU for consultations. To 
this end, examples include the violation of the human rights of ACP immigrants in EU 
Member States, the shipping of toxic waste on EU registered ships, and cases of fraud and 
corruption at EU institutions and in EU Member States. It could be argued that the provision 
to allow any of the parties to the CA to call for consultations is in fact distorted, since the 
ACP Group does not have the means to impose the “appropriate measures” (read sanctions) 
as provided for in Articles 96 and 97. 
The unilateral invocation of Article 96 in part reflects the reality of the power distribution 
between the ACP Group and the EU. The imbalance of power between the partners trickles 
down to many other manifestations, including the extent to which joint ‘fact finding 
                                                
30 Birdsall 2007, 242. 
31 See www.bond.org  
32 BOND 2006, 2. 
33 Commission Communication 2003. 
34 European Union 2000, 96 par. 27. 
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missions’ are deployed to political ‘hot spots’ by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
(JPA). The EU can use development aid, trade preferences and other ‘carrots’ to push its 
agenda and interests, and the (threat of) withdrawal of these as ‘sticks’. The ability to 
distribute these resources affords the EU with a considerable degree of ‘power’, and the 
exercise of that power is governance, in accordance with the definition by the EC cited 
above.35 While access to resources gives the possessor potential power, it can also be 
argued that aid recipient countries grant the EU this power by allowing the resources that 
the EU has at its disposal to be used as leverage. If aid recipients were to decline the aid, 
either categorically or under specific circumstances, these elements of ‘power’ would 
dissipate.  In other words, it is the recipients’ desire for these resources, and inability to 
eschew manipulation in order to access them, that turns the potential power into real 
power. 
As the specified overarching objective of the ‘partnership’ between the ACP Group and the 
EU is the sustainable development of the ACP States, it is worthwhile to examine more 
carefully what is meant by ‘development’. 
                                                
35 Commission Communication 2003. 
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4 DEVELOPMENT 
Ideas about what constitutes development have evolved significantly amongst 
contemporary development economics scholars, and this definitional evolution has been 
paralleled by changes in development theory and strategies.36 Various scholars have traced 
the evolution of thinking about development in modern times.37 While development 
economists, as epitomised by Dudley Seers,38 over the last quarter century have seen the 
purpose of development as the reduction of poverty, inequality and unemployment, 
contemporary scholars, such as Amartya Sen39 employ the broader concept of ‘human 
development’, which includes reducing ‘deprivation’ as well as broadening choice.40 For 
Sen, ‘deprivation’ encompasses hunger, illiteracy, illness, poor health, powerlessness, 
voicelessness, insecurity, humiliation and a lack of access to basic infrastructure,41 while 
‘choice’ includes, inter alia, access to information, education, participation, and degree of 
democracy and liberty.42 Despite this conceptual expansion, Nafziger argues that the 
integration of economic development, human rights and conflict reduction into a more 
holistic understanding of the meaning of development remains an important challenge.43  
The EU’s theoretical understanding of the concept ‘development’ is captured in the 
European Consensus on Development that was adopted in 2006.44 It outlines a new 
framework for the implementation of the EU’s development policy, with particular focus on 
the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and provides a common vision 
designed to guide the development cooperation of the EU, both at its Member States’ and 
Community levels.  The Consensus is grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable 
and participatory human and social development, and it emphasises the promotion of 
human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. Similarly, the CA underscores 
economic, social and cultural facets of development, which clearly concurs with a broad 
conception of human development that encompasses reducing ‘deprivation’ as well as 
broadening choice.45 
Governance is a concept that has come to play a very present role in discussions about 
sustainable development. In this context, it has been used as an explanation for why 
development strategies and aid have failed (e.g. due to bad governance), as well as the key 
to making development (assistance) work (e.g. by implementing good governance). 
Montagner discusses three ways in which the term governance has been used in the context 
of the EU’s development politics.46 These include governance applied to the European 
space and to Community politics, (good) governance within partner countries of the EU, 
and governance at the heart of the ‘organisational field’ of civil society. More recently 
some attention has been given to ‘aid governance’, whereby donors have been under 
pressure to apply governance principles in their management of their aid to developing 
                                                
36 Thorbecke 2007. 
37 See Nafziger 2007, Ibid. 
38 Seers 1979. 
39 Sen 1999. 
40 Nafziger 2007, Thorbecke 2007. 
41 Nafziger 2007, 52. 
42 Thorbecke 2007, 29. 
43 Nafziger 2007, 59. 
44 Commission Communication 2006, 421. 
45 Nafziger 2007; Sen 1999; Thorbecke 2007. 
46 Montagner 2006. 
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counties.47 The present study is interested not only in the governance of aid, but all aspects 
of governance within the context of the ACP-EU ‘partnership’, with particular regard for 
their consequences for sustainable development in ACP countries.  
                                                
47 Ceuppens 2006. 
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5 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENTS 
Distinguishing governance as a purposive activity from governance as an explanatory tool 
(for example to explain development policy failures), Yanakopoulos investigates the 
mechanisms through which governance as a purposive activity occurs.48 She examines the 
ways in which NGOs influence two processes of governance in particular: norm setting and 
framing issue areas. Here we will examine governance mechanisms used by the EU in the 
context of its relationship with the ACP Group. According to the CA and other policy 
papers, in its relations with ACP States the EU employs, inter alia, the following 
instruments to promote good governance in development cooperation: conditionalities,49 
‘additional support’ for results-oriented reforms, incentives, and ‘appropriate measures’ 
(sanctions) as specified in Articles 96 and 97 of the CA. However, it can be argued that EU 
governance is manifested through additional practices, which include: the determination of 
priority areas and recipients to benefit from financial assistance; negotiation strategies, 
such as stipulations for the configuration of negotiation partners and linking financial 
perspectives with certain policy orientations; the identification of interlocutors as 
development partners; trade and commercial practices within development cooperation, 
such as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs); Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) 
and subsidies; and the design of other policies that influence the EU-ACP relationship.50  
In the following section, we will examine a variety of EU instruments and practices that in 
fact are governance mechanisms. These governance mechanisms will be assessed with 
regard to: 1) whether the way in which they are wielded exemplifies ‘good governance’ as 
a process and 2) whether these processes have or are likely to result in ‘good governance’ 
as an outcome, particularly sustainable development and poverty reduction. The examples 
presented here are chosen for their capacity to illustrate contradictions and undesirable 
consequences. Thus, we critically highlight examples of bad governance rather than 
offering a representative sample of governance mechanisms and their use. There are 
certainly many examples of good governance practices by the EU in its relations with the 
ACP Group, but our aim is to target the areas that can be improved. Concrete suggestions 
for improvement are discussed in the final section of the paper. 
5.1 Wielding the ‘Governance’ Concept 
The first mechanism we will examine is use of the concept of ‘(good) governance’. Adding 
adjectives such as ‘bad’ or ‘good’ to governance, and specifying a desired outcome of 
governance processes, such as sustainable development, makes more explicit the normative 
aspect inherent to the concept’s use. However, whether or not certain outcomes of 
governance processes are included explicitly or only presumed implicitly when the concept 
is employed, it has been argued that mere use of the concept has been an act of 
governance. This notion is expressed by Campbell: 
                                                
48 Yanakopoulos 2005. 
49 While the CA refers to ‘conditionalities’, later policy documents declare an attempt to move away 
from their use.  
50 For example, policy changes outlined in the Lisbon Treaty are likely to significantly influence the 
EU’s relationship with the ACP Group. 
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“In spite of the use of administrative language formulated in terms of 
efficiency and good management, put forward as neutral, as if to address 
essentially technical issues, the notion of governance as proposed by the 
multilateral financial institutions entails a particular concept of the state, 
of its role, of its desirable evolution, of state-market relations, of the 
exercise of power and of a particular political project. In this sense, the 
notion of governance may be shown to be eminently political.”51 
Campbell accuses such institutions of lacking transparency in their use of the concept of 
governance because they obscure its ‘political’ dimension in portraying it as merely 
technical.  
Various authors have argued that the EU has imposed its own models for governing and 
other priorities under the rubric of promoting ‘good governance’.52  This is evident in the 
EU’s Governance Initiative for ACP States and the associated ‘governance incentive 
tranche’, developed in 2007.53 The governance incentive tranche is an instrument for 
providing supplementary funding to states who credibly commit themselves to satisfactory 
governance reforms. To this end, the ‘governance profile’ is an analytical tool that provides 
an overview of nine areas of governance and assists in identifying main weaknesses and 
reform priorities.54 It is not jointly developed with the country in question, nor are its 
contents fully shared.  Rather, based upon the EU’s assessment of the country’s 
‘governance profile’, the country is encouraged to provide ‘relevant, ambitious and 
credible commitments to reform’ in its ‘Governance Action Plan’ (GAP).55 The amount of 
the ‘incentive tranche’ is unilaterally determined by the EC, and this ‘additional support’ is 
utilised to effectuate the reforms stipulated in the GAP. Thus, the introduction of the 
‘governance incentive tranche’56 and the procedure through which it is allocated manifest a 
kind of ex-ante rather than ex-post conditionality. BOND argues that: 
“…although not presented in this way, [governance criteria and] assessment 
mechanisms involve political processes driven by donor government 
interests. They lack transparency and fail to explicitly acknowledge the 
value-laden assumptions, and their selective application, regarding models 
of ‘good governance’. In this regard, they mark a regressive shift away from 
the more explicit focus and at least policy level commitment to quality 
assurance of process and not product. The use of ‘governance’ 
assessments, either to justify or hold back development assistance is 
inherently ‘anti-developmental’ and undermines good governance.”57 
The EU’s use of the concept ‘good governance’ is exemplified in its failure to distinguish 
between ‘good’ and ‘democratic’ governance and by the elements subsumed under these 
rubrics. In various EC documents the phrases ‘good governance’ and ‘democratic 
                                                
51 Campbell 2006, 4. 
52 Montagner 2006. 
53 The tranche is allocated and disbursed as ‘additional resources’ to the initial country allocation. 
See EC (2009). See Molenaers and Nijs 2009 and Carbone (this volume) for assessments of the tranche. 
54 (1) Political governance: human rights, fundamental freedoms, electoral process, constitutional 
democracy; (2) The rule of law: judicial and law enforcement system; (3) Control of corruption; (4) 
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governance’ are used interchangeably.58 For example, the European Commission states that 
‘good governance, though a complementary objective, is basically a means towards the 
ends represented by poverty reduction and the other MDGs. The document specifies that 
aspects of ‘democratic governance’ include:  
“…the affirmation of the rights of citizens on the road to sustainable 
development and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(including freedom of expression, information and association); support for 
democratisation processes and the involvement of citizens in choosing and 
overseeing those who govern them; respect for the rule of law and access 
for all to an independent justice system; access to information; a 
government that governs transparently and is accountable to the relevant 
institutions and to the electorate; human security; management of 
migration flows; effective institutions, access to basic social services, 
sustainable management of natural and energy resources and of the 
environment, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth and social 
cohesion in a climate conducive to private investment.”59 
The failure to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘democratic’ allows one issue to be guised in 
the rubric of another. For example, it can be argued that ‘access to basic social services’ 
and ‘management of migration flows’ have nothing to do with ‘democratic governance’ but 
have a lot to do with ‘good governance’. Ironically, an earlier EC Communication on 
Governance and Development clearly makes this distinction in stating: 
“Governance concerns the state’s ability to serve the citizens. Such a broad 
approach allows conceptually to disaggregate governance and other topics 
such as human rights, democracy or corruption.”60   
By framing a laundry list of its own priorities as aspects of ‘good governance’, and 
designing mechanisms purportedly to evaluate countries’ achievements at attaining this 
‘goodness’, the EU attempts to establish a particular set of social norms and conventions to 
guide the decisions and actions of its developing partners. In concurrence, BOND points out 
that: 
“some of the indicators in the ‘governance profiles’ have little to do with a 
government’s ability to act in the interests of the country’s citizens and of 
poverty eradication, and are more to do with EU interests – for example 
what the EU thinks the government should do to stem migration, or to 
create an ‘investment-friendly’ climate.”61  
An NGO network called ‘CIDSE’ (Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la 
Solidarité) argues that even the EU’s process of defining and setting the criteria for 
‘governance’ failed to adhere to its own criteria for good governance.62 Although the 
Communication63 released by the EC claims that the EC approach is process oriented, 
broad, inclusive and in particular facilitates civil society participation, CIDSE sees ‘grave 
contradictions between the EC’s definition and principles of governance and its own actions 
in this field’.64 In particular, it argues that the time allocated for consultations was ‘too 
                                                
58 Commission Communication 2006, 421; European Commission 2009a, 3 – 4. EC Staff Working paper 
on ‘Supporting democratic governance through the governance initiative: A review and the way 
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59 Commission Communication 2006, 421,1,1. 
60 Commission Communication 2003. 
61 BOND 2006. 
62 CIDSE 2006. 
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limited to allow meaningful input from partners in the South’.65 It further claims that 
‘While talking about ownership and broad inclusive processes, the EC had already 
unilaterally defined governance profiles, indicators and allocation criteria in the planning 
tools for the 10th EDF which will have a serious impact of funding – in particular through the 
provision of “incentive tranches” depending on governance performance and commitments 
to governance reform’.66 In addition to its critique of the process, CIDSE further establishes 
that the governance priorities outlined by the EU do not coincide with the priorities 
expressed by NGOs in aid-recipient countries. It outlines the priorities expressed by its 
partners in a survey, underscoring divergences with those emphasized in EU policy.  
CONCORD cites an example of a case in which the EU imposed its priorities over those of an 
aid recipient country under the auspices of promoting ‘good governance’:  
“In Zambia, the government has chosen to prioritise Health and Education 
as priority sectors for EC Aid. But the EU has rejected these priorities while 
imposing unclear and dubious priorities such as governance and 
competitiveness. By doing so, Brussels clearly disrespects Zambia’s 
sovereignty. It is particularly severe as it concerns a country, like others in 
the Southern Africa region, which is highly hit by HIV/AIDS, that is 
destroying its fragile basic social system.”67 
Hidden under the guise of the rubrics ‘good governance’ and ‘incentives’, the EU continues 
to coerce development partners to follow EU positions and policies. Contrary to the criteria 
of good governance as a process, this process lacks transparency and results in a lack of 
ownership on behalf of the countries targeted by the policies. Furthermore, the outcome of 
this governance may also be less than ‘good’, since priorities are set that are not 
necessarily in the best interest of the developing country, as exemplified in the case of 
Zambia.  
5.2 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
The CA stipulates that EPAs68 would be negotiated in order to better integrate the ACP 
States into the global economy, promote sustainable development and eradicate poverty in 
these countries. Both the content of these agreements – which was still being negotiated 
when this article was penned – as well as the process of negotiations can be seen as 
mechanisms of governance.  
The EPA negotiation process was to a great extent stipulated by the EU, by some accounts, 
against the will – and interests – of the ACP States. First, the EU stipulated that EPAs were 
to be concluded not with the ACP Group as a whole, but with six regions within the ACP 
Group. Furthermore, no country could negotiate within more than one region. Since some 
countries in Africa are members of more than one regional organisation, they were forced 
to choose between these groupings. The resulting negotiating groups coincide neither with 
the six regions of the ACP Group, nor with the membership patterns of the regional 
organisations. In other words, new regional groupings were formed on the basis of 
countries’ interests for the purpose of negotiating EPAs with the EU. The ACP Group has 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Concord 2007. 
68 The Cotonou Agreement stipulates that the Parties will conclude new World Trade Organization 
(WTO)-compatible trading arrangements by 2008. EPAs are meant to be free trade agreements, that 
will end the non-reciprocal and preferential trade arrangements between the EU and ACP States, 
which are incompatible with WTO rules. 
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expressed concern that the pre-existing regional integration processes have been stalled 
due to the focus placed upon the new alignments for EPAs negotiations – in spite of the fact 
that supporting existing regional integration efforts is allegedly a main goal of these 
agreements.69 Bilal and Stevens have underscored the dangers to African regional 
integration efforts posed by the signing of ‘interim’ EPAs by some, but not all, members of 
the African negotiating groups, which precisely described the state of affairs when this 
article went to press. These authors describe one of the challenges that EPAs pose for 
African regional integration: 
“A common perception, expressed by many countries, is that there is little 
coherence between the EPA agenda and the regional integration processes 
in Africa. One particular concern has been that countries in the same 
economic region might liberalise different baskets of products and so 
create new barriers to intra-regional trade in order to avoid trade 
deflection. This concern has been vindicated by the interim EPAs that have 
been agreed.”70  
Thus, the EU’s stipulations for negotiations and the content of interim EPAs have impacted 
the geopolitical structure of African regions of the ACP Group and threatened the existing 
regional integration processes.   
By insisting on moving negotiations to the regional level, the EU finessed the possibility of 
more concerted action on behalf of the Group as an entity.71 The regional negotiating 
groups are smaller and thus have less power to negotiate an agreement that favours the 
interest of the developing countries. Due to the EU’s relative power and ability to assert its 
will, the developmental consequences of the still incomplete results of the regional 
negotiations have been a matter of great concern. In its 2009 Resolution, the ACP Council 
of Ministers underscored ‘the absence of a comprehensive development oriented EPA’.72 We 
now turn to examine the potential of the EPAs for promoting sustainable development and 
reducing poverty in ACP countries. 
The reciprocal nature of EPAs, whereby the EU and ACP regions are supposed to open their 
markets to each other in a reciprocal fashion, has been underscored as problematic by 
various development-oriented committees and organizations.73 NGOs and the European 
Parliament’s development committee have underscored the need for additional funds to 
assist developing countries to adjust to the competition induced through market openness. 
Even European Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, has stated that ‘Trade will not 
promote development without parallel investment in the supply side’.74 Mandelson’s 
acknowledgement is sustained and elaborated by scholars such as Birdsall who states that: 
“Openness is not necessarily good for the poor. Reducing trade protection 
has not brought growth to today’s poorest countries, including many in 
Africa, and open capital markets have not been particularly good for the 
poorest households within many developing countries, including many of 
the emerging market economies of Asia and Latin America.”75  
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73 See, for example, Oxfam International 2006. 
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Birdsall claims that many of the world’s poorest countries, including most of the poor 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa have been ‘open’ for more than two decades. However, 
many of these countries are commodity dependent, and the value of their exports has 
stagnated during the same period. As a result, they have not been able to increase their 
imports relative to their GDP. She further states that, in addition to lower overall growth, 
developing countries have had higher volatility of growth rates compared to advanced 
economies in every decade since the 1960’s. Birdsall argues that this volatility, which can 
be associated with open markets and especially open capital markets, is most dangerous for 
the poor within countries.76 This concurs with extensive empirical evidence that openness 
contributes to within-country inequality.77 According to Nissanke and Thorbecke:  
“Opening up to global competition has also led to job losses and 
deterioration in working conditions and employment conditions.… The 
overall impact of globalization on poverty has been relatively small. The 
majority of the poor are not engaged in global production and other 
strategies are required to reach them. Clearly, integration with the global 
economy is not a substitute for an anti-poverty strategy.”78   
These authors argue that internal growth, specialization and integration in the poor 
countries are prerequisites to benefit from globalization-induced growth. Without these 
factors in place, ‘many low-income countries could be locked in an international poverty 
trap through integration’.79 An EU push for the conclusion and implementation of EPAs that 
force open ACP markets before these factors are in place, and even prior to any successful 
conclusion of the Doha Development Round of negotiations at the WTO, will be 
counterproductive to ACP development.   
In spite of widespread recognition that developing countries must first make various 
adjustments before they stand the potential to benefit from opening their markets, in the 
content of the interim EPAs, ‘no clear pattern can be identified that the poorer countries 
have longer to adjust than the richer ones or of the EPAs being tailored to development 
needs (however defined)’.80 In their assessment of the interim agreements, Bilal and 
Stevens conclude that: 
“The picture that emerges is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that 
countries have a deal that reflects their negotiating skills and the EU’s 
interest: that countries able to negotiate hard, knowing their interests 
(which were not incompatible with those of the European Commission) have 
obtained a better deal than those lacking these characteristics.”81 
Furthermore, the EC has refused requests for additional funding for adjustment programs 
that would allow the developing countries to take advantage of opportunities created 
through EPAs. For example, a letter signed by the EC’s Deputy Director for Trade, Karl 
Falkenberg, and the Director General for Development and Relations with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States, Stefano Manservisi, rejected the Pacific region’s proposal 
that certain concessions on market access on their part be compensated by the EU with 
additional funding for adjustment costs.82 In spite of the fact that the EC has repeatedly 
argued that adjustment funding will be provided through the EDF rather than the EPA, the 
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81 Ibid, 4. 
82 Oxfam International 2006. 
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10th EDF allocates no additional funds for EPA-related adjustment costs. Bilal and Stevens 
have stated that, ‘in terms of predictable levels available for the years to come, one thing 
is clear: the EDF cannot be the only source of AfT (Aid for Trade)’.83 Oxfam International 
concludes that, ‘without funding for adjustment, an EPA cannot hope to provide a 
developmentally supportive framework in countries with limited capacities and 
resources’.84  
In its EPA negotiating strategies and content proposals, the EU is not displaying the key 
attributes that it uses to characterize good governance. Both the negotiating processes and 
outcomes may be detrimental to regional integration in the ACP regions, which could have 
far-reaching political and security consequences. The faltering of intra-regional integration 
as well as the agendas that the EU is attempting to impose on the ACP regions in the 
context of EPAs could impact negatively on the sustainable development and alleviation of 
poverty in ACP States.    
5.3 Partner Preferences 
While the EU is attempting to consolidate itself as a unified actor on the global stage, some 
of its actions have contributed to the fragmentation and de-construction of the ACP 
Group.85 In its dealings with ACP countries, the EC has in recent years shown various signs 
of withdrawing from the ACP Group as an interlocutor. It has designed separate strategy 
papers for its relations with the Caribbean, the Pacific, South Africa and ‘Africa’86 and it 
later elaborated a ‘joint strategy’ with the latter87 Seemingly in contradiction to the EC’s 
rationale for the latter strategy – that is, to have one common strategy for Africa, the EC 
has separate strategies for South Africa and for several northern African countries, which 
are addressed in the EC’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)88. In a further 
manifestation of disfavour for the ACP Group, the former European Commissioner for 
Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, publicly expressed a preference for 
working with the regions. The EC has granted high levels of support, financial and 
otherwise, to the African Union, often with only the reluctant and post-hoc approval of the 
ACP Group. These actions undermine the ACP Group and empower the actors favoured by 
the EC. This form of EU governance has a direct impact on the kinds of actors that are 
empowered to act on behalf of ACP interests and on development. One possibility is that 
this process will result in dissolution of the ACP Group as such. If this is the case, the full 
weight of the Group will be lost and only smaller groupings of developing countries will 
defend their interests in negotiations with the EU. This could result in less advantageous 
outcomes for sustainable development and poverty reduction in developing countries.89  
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5.4  European Development Fund (EDF) 
The EDF90 is the main instrument for providing EU aid for development cooperation in ACP 
States. The 10th EDF, to be dispersed during the period 2008 – 2013, amounts to € 22,682 
million. This fund is divided between national and regional indicative programmes, intra-
ACP programmes and projects, investment facilities, EU Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCTs) and the European Commission itself (to cover expenditures for programming and 
implementation, such as its offices and staff in developing countries). In accordance with 
the CA, ‘ACP States and Regions shall determine the development strategies for their 
economies and societies in all sovereignty’ …’.91  In practice, negotiations over the setting 
of development priorities in ACP countries and regions take place in an environment of 
‘trade-offs’ between the aid recipients and the EU. The result of these negotiations is that 
the EU’s external priorities and commitments are pursued, whilst the ACP Group plays a 
minor role in the programming of EU financial resources. The EU’s ability to impose its 
agenda on ACP states and regions reflects the inequality of the partnership and the 
imbalance of power; the fact that it does so contradicts the CA stipulation that  
development strategies shall be determined ‘in all sovereignty’ by the regions and 
countries concerned. This contradiction reflects not only a lack of transparency in the 
agenda-setting process but also means that the EU is left entirely unaccountable for the 
consequences thereof. Both transparency and accountability are key aspects of good 
governance, as characterized by the EU itself. Furthermore, contrary to the ownership 
criterion of good governance, Bilal and Stevens conclude that ‘EU donors’ procedures and 
practices are not conducive to full ownership’.92  
5.5 Revision of the Cotonou Agreement (CA) 
The EU’s imposition of its agenda, and the inequality and power imbalance in the ACP – EU 
partnership, were also made glaringly evident during the negotiations for the 2005 revision 
of the CA.  The negotiations reached an impasse on the EU’s insistence to include an article 
on ‘cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’,93 and the 
EU’s reluctance to provide details on the next multi-annual financial framework for the 
period 2008 – 2013.94 To unblock the impasse, the EU negotiators offered the ACP Council 
of Ministers a so-called ‘package deal’, whereby a multi-annual financial framework would 
be provided on condition that the ACP group accept the inclusion of the proposed article. 
Thus, ACP Ministers were confronted with the choice to accept Euro 22,682 million in 
development aid and include the article on weapons of mass destruction, or to renounce 
the financial framework by not accepting the EU imposition. Due to the consequent 
inclusion of the article, ACP countries are now further burdened with border-control 
responsibilities, in order to prevent weapons trafficking, but they have been allocated no 
additional resources to cover the high cost of these imposed duties. Consequently, in order 
to cover the costs of this EU priority, funds must be diverted from other ‘development’ 
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priorities. Neither the negotiation process, nor the foreseeable outcomes for sustainable 
development bear the marks of good governance.  
5.6 Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) 
ACP-EU relations on fishing are currently governed by ‘bilateral’ agreements between the 
EC and individual ACP States. During a fact finding mission by an ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) delegation to the Seychelles during the period 25 – 27 April 
2008 certain problems were raised in relation to the FPA between the Seychelles and the 
EU.95 Non-State Actors complained of little EU involvement in the implementation of this 
Agreement. In particular, they claimed that Seychellois seamen serving on EU registered 
vessels did not receive the full wage they were entitled to under the FPA, and they pointed 
out that the EU has been paying the same licensing fee for tuna for some 30 years, despite 
much higher market prices. Furthermore, contrary to the principle of ownership, Seychelles 
authorities stated that the FPA dictates how the Government is to utilise the remuneration 
the EU pays under the FPA.96 They also claimed that EU Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) 
rules were inconsistent or applied in an arbitrary manner. For example it was pointed out 
that different maximum levels of cadmium were set for EU OCTs, such as Reunion and the 
Seychelles, and that all Seychelles vessels are required to have non-wooden deck, whilst 
the majority of EC vessels still use wooden decks.97 Finally, there is evidence that indicates 
that EU fishing vessels have vastly under-reported, and thus under-paid, their catches. The 
EU’s failure to implement consistent standards and rules as well as its dictation of how 
remuneration is to be spent, are characteristic of poor governance processes. Its failure to 
pay fair wages to citizens of developing countries, to pay fair licensing fees, and to enforce 
honest reporting and payments by its vessels starkly detract from the good governance goal 
of poverty reduction.   
Furthermore, the report of the fact-finding mission states that the Seychelles and 
surrounding countries requested the EC to consider a regional fisheries agreement, to 
replace the bilateral agreements currently in place. However, according to the report, this 
was turned down by the European Commission.98 As with the Seychelles, the EC also 
rejected repeated requests from the Pacific for a regional fisheries agreement. According 
to Oxfam International: 
“The EU’s pursuit of bilateral fisheries agreements is inconsistent with their 
[sic] state aim of promoting regional cooperation in the Pacific and tends to 
divide the Pacific over the benefits from one of the region’s key 
resources.”99 
The regional contention resulting from the bilateral agreements poses a threat not only to 
cooperation, integration and political stability in the region but also to long-term, 
sustainable economic development. Failure to solidify a regional approach to manage such 
important finite resources could easily lead to every country grabbing – or selling the rights 
to grab – as much as they can while the supply lasts. This would quickly result in a complete 
depletion of the fish population, which would have a devastating effect on the Pacific 
economy, way of life, and the health of its people. Already, as a result of the FPAs, the 
strong presence of EU fishing boats has rendered local fishing companies unable to 
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24  IES Working Paper 1/2010 
 
   
compete. Labourers from ACP countries have lost their jobs in the local fishing industries 
and have thus been forced to migrate – often without legal documentation – to look for 
other work.  
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6 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The EU has considerable resources at its disposal that contribute to a significant power 
differential between it and the ACP Group. It wields a variety of mechanisms to govern 
these resources in its relationship with ACP States. By illuminating a few of these 
mechanisms, this paper has endeavoured to shed some light on these governance processes 
and their outcomes. There is considerable evidence that some policies pursued by the EU 
are not conducive to the promotion of sustainable development, the alleviation of poverty, 
and the gradual integration of ACP States into the world economy. The EU has abused its 
power advantage to impose its political will and economic agenda. The processes by which 
these impositions occur are far from transparent. We have illuminated various mechanisms 
that the EU, and especially the EC, has used to steer the members of the ACP Group toward 
compliance with its own interests and agendas. The opaque nature of these processes, and 
the fact that they leave the EU entirely unaccountable for their consequences, are 
trademarks of processes of bad governance.  We have further analyzed actual and potential 
outcomes of these governance processes and have found that many of them have resulted, 
or are likely to result, in consequences that bode ill for sustainable development and the 
alleviation of poverty in the developing countries. The mark of bad governance as an 
outcome results from the EU’s failure to adhere to policies that it rhetorically endorses. 
The EU is not managing its relations with the ACP Group in accordance with its vows to 
respect ACP sovereignty and promote ownership of adopted policies.  
In reaction to critiques of how the EU has wielded power in its relationship with developing 
countries, as well as suggestions that the EU should be held accountable for its actions in 
this regard, the EC affirmed a commitment to ‘dialogue with due regard for principles of 
partnership’ (rather than conditionality) and ‘ownership’ as well as to ‘focusing on both the 
responsibilities of donors and partner countries in improving governance (mutual 
accountability)’.100 Unfortunately, the foregoing analyses have illustrated that this stated 
commitment has still left much to be desired regarding its manifestation in practice. The 
EC has also failed to ensure synergies and coherence between the different EC and EU 
policies and instruments, a declared aim of its Communication on Governance and 
Development.101  
In collaborations based upon equality and mutual respect, partners work together at all 
levels and stages, from design to implementation and evaluation. A genuine partnership 
between the EU and the ACP Group must be based on a jointly developed structured 
cooperation framework that sets out the responsibilities of both sides, includes regular and 
transparent dialogue, and allows the developing countries to take the lead in the 
formulation of their own development strategies. All provisions of the CA should be 
regarded as subordinate to the key objectives of the Agreement, including ‘appropriate 
measures’, conditionalities, and – perhaps more importantly -- how these are determined. 
Of course partners must adhere to their commitments. However, rather than imposing 
duties upon the recipient that it is ill-suited to fulfill, the donor should first assist the 
recipient such that it is able to assume greater responsibilities. Given the imbalance 
inherent to donor-recipient relationships, it is the duty of the donor to enable the recipient 
to evolve into a more powerful and equal partner.  
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Due to some of the current realities of political and social power dynamics in some African 
countries, which Taylor has illuminated, one cannot advocate simply writing a blank check 
to developing country governments. On the other hand, the EU’s ‘paternalistic’ claims that 
it should stipulate how aid is used because it knows what is best for the aid recipients must 
be grounded in evidence.102 Evidence provided in this paper demonstrates that the 
governance outcomes do not justify the governance means employed by the EU. While the 
EU governance processes discussed have been marked by coercion, the outcomes bode ill 
for sustainable development in ACP countries. Policies that support sustainable 
development include paying fair wages and fees for services rendered, applying standards 
fairly, and resisting the temptation to exploit resources that sustain ACP economies and 
ways of life. Contrarily, on various accounts the EU has promoted policies and engaged in 
practices that have contributed to further deprivation in ACP States and regions.     
Interference in ACP development agendas is only justified when it can be shown that their 
implementation would not serve the ACP peoples. When this is the case, or if ACP countries 
fall short of expectations, rather than imposing duties upon the ACP Group that it is ill-
suited to fulfill, the EU should first provide the Group with means for capacity building and 
institutional support that will allow for the development of a capable, credible, and 
respected partner.    
What else can be done to promote the gradual integration of ACP States into the global 
economy? According to Nissanke and Thorbecke: 
“Whether global market forces establish a virtuous circle or a vicious circle 
depends on the initial conditions at the time of exposure and the effective 
design and implementation of policies to manage the integration 
process.”103  
Consequently, these authors advocate the constitution of global governance structures that 
promote development. Birdsall also claims that ‘the global economy needs the civilizing 
hand of appropriate intervention’, which she argues must include more transfers from rich 
to poor countries, more active management of global problems such as money laundering, 
tax evasion, sovereign bankruptcy, capital flight, global health and environmental issues, 
and a ‘global social contract’.104  
Bardhan105 also argues that the effect of globalization (that is, open trade and investment 
regimes) on inequality is not an argument against globalization but rather for ‘public 
programmes to protect the poor’. In other words, the effects of globalization (open trade 
and investment regimes) can be ‘filtered’ – that is, intensified or hindered – through 
institutions and other governance mechanisms. 
In order to support the integration of ACP countries into the global economy in a way that 
promotes sustainable development and poverty reduction, the EU should first ensure that 
global governance structures are in place that can competently manage the integration 
process. To support the creation of, and provide resources for, competent, transparent and 
accountable global structures would be acts of good governance. 
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Finally, to a certain extent, the ACP Group elevates the EC to its relatively powerful 
position by failing to act in a collective fashion in order to condense and wield potential 
power of its own. The ACP Group does have potential carrots and sticks at its disposal. For 
example, collectively ACP States have attractive natural resources and vast markets, access 
to which is desired not only by the EU but also others (such as China and the USA). 
Furthermore, the collective voice of 79 developing countries, plus the support of 
development-friendly NGOs and other benefactors, could exert a considerable amount of 
normative pressure. They might begin with a critique of the EC’s wielding of governance 
mechanisms.  
Since the EC’s power leverage largely derives from its command of the EDF, changes in how 
this fund is governed could make the system less prone to the abuse of power. While the 
EDF is funded by voluntary contributions from EU Member States, it is managed by the EC. 
Notwithstanding the at least rhetorical stipulation that funding decisions be made in 
consultation with the ACP Group, the EC currently has sole decision-making powers over 
the disbursement of the EDF. As it is a separate instrument from the EU general budget, 
the European Parliament (EP) has no oversight over the EC’s management of the EDF. EU 
Member States and the EP generally act as checks and balances to the EC, and they have 
frequently critiqued the ECs actions in relations with developing countries. Thus, a system 
of development aid and cooperation that has these checks and balances in place might 
prove more apt at engaging in well-governed and development-conducive partnerships. A 
partner that manifests the criteria of good governance in its relationships, especially in 
those with weaker counterparts, will also be better positioned to advocate good 
governance.   
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ACP   African, Caribbean and Pacific 
AU  African Union 
CA  Cotonou Agreement 
CIDSE   Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité 
DG  Directorate-General 
EC  European Commission 
ECDPM  European Centre for Development Policy Management 
EDF  European Development Fund 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EPAs  Economic Partnership Agreements 
EU  European Union 
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
JPA  Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals 
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organizations 
OCTs  Overseas Countries and Territories 
SPS  Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary   
UN  United Nations 
UNU-CRIS United Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies 
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights 
USA  United States of America 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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